



# Sanitizable Signatures with Different Admissibility Policies for Multiple Sanitizers

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Olivier Raynaud<sup>1</sup>


<sup>1</sup> Université Clermont Auvergne, LIMOS, CNRS

<sup>2</sup> École Polytechnique, <sup>3</sup> BeYs, <sup>4</sup> ASTEROIDE, Trust4Sign

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- Motivation
- Sanitizable signatures and our contribution
- Building blocks
- Constructions
- Implementation

# Rental Application



# Sanitizable Signatures

Signer



Sanitizer



Verifier

# Sanitizable Signatures



**Idea:** Multi-Sanitizer Sanitizable Signatures with Different Admissibility Policies

# Sanitizable Signatures




**Idea:** Multi-Sanitizer Sanitizable Signatures with Different Admissibility Policies


## Security Properties:

- Unforgeability
- Accountability
- Immutability
- Invisibility
- Privacy
- Unlinkability
- Transparency
- Sanitizer Anonymity

# Use Case 1: Full-Sanitization Verifiable k-SAN (FSV-k-SAN)



## Use Case 2: Invisible-Unlinkable-Transparent k-SAN (IUT-k-SAN)



# Building Blocks

<b>PKE</b> A Public key encryption with homomorphic scalar multiplication	<b>VRS</b> A verifiable ring signature scheme
<b>CHash</b> A Chameleon hash function	<b>SIG</b> A digital signature scheme
<b>BLS</b> A short signature scheme with key and signature randomization	<b>EQS</b> A structure preserving signature on equivalence classes

# Notation

**Algorithms:** Setup, KGen<sub>S</sub>, KGen<sub>Z</sub>, Sign, Sanitize, Verify, Prove, Judge.

$$m = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline m_1 & m_2 & \dots & m_n \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$\text{PKZ} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline \text{pk}_Z^1 & \text{pk}_Z^2 & \dots & \text{pk}_Z^k \\ \hline \end{array}$$


$$\mathbf{A} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & \dots & a_{1,n} \\ \hline a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & \dots & a_{2,n} \\ \hline \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \hline a_{k,1} & a_{k,2} & \dots & a_{k,n} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$\text{MOD} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline j_1 & j_2 & \dots \\ \hline m'_{j_1} & m'_{j_2} & \dots \\ \hline \end{array}$$

# FSV-k-SAN Construction


<b>PKE</b> A Public key encryption	<b>VRS</b> A verifiable ring signature scheme
<b>CHash</b> A Chameleon hash function	<b>SIG</b> A digital signature scheme

## FSV-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )




$$m = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline m_1 & m_2 & m_3 \\ \hline \end{array}$$
$$\mathbf{CH} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline h_1 & h_2 & h_3 \\ \hline r_1 & r_2 & r_3 \\ \hline pk_{CH}^1 & pk_{CH}^2 & pk_{CH}^3 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

# FSV-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )




$$m = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline m_1 & m_2 & m_3 \\ \hline \end{array}$$
$$\mathbf{CH} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline h_1 & h_2 & h_3 \\ \hline r_1 & r_2 & r_3 \\ \hline \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^1 & \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^2 & \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^3 \\ \hline \end{array}$$
$$\mathbf{SKCH} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{\text{ZE}}^1} & \{\text{sk}_{\text{CH}}^2\}_{\text{pk}_{\text{ZE}}^1} & \{\text{sk}_{\text{CH}}^3\}_{\text{pk}_{\text{ZE}}^1} \\ \hline \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{\text{ZE}}^2} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{\text{ZE}}^2} & \{\text{sk}_{\text{CH}}^3\}_{\text{pk}_{\text{ZE}}^2} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

# FSV-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )




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$$\mathbf{PA} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline 0 & 1 & 1 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

# FSV-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )




$$\begin{aligned}
 m &= \begin{bmatrix} m_1 & m_2 & m_3 \end{bmatrix} \\
 \mathbf{CH} &= \begin{bmatrix} h_1 & h_2 & h_3 \\ r_1 & r_2 & r_3 \\ \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^1 & \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^2 & \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^3 \end{bmatrix} \\
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 \mathbf{PA} &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\
 s &= \text{Sign}_{\text{SIG}} \left( \left( (\mathbf{CH}_j \cdot h, \mathbf{CH}_j \cdot \text{pk}_{\text{CH}})_{j \in [n]}, \mathbf{SKCH}, \right. \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \left. \mathbf{PA}, \text{pk}_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, n \right) \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

# FSV-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )




$$\begin{aligned}
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 &\quad \left. \left. \mathbf{PA}, \text{pk}_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, n \right) \right) \\
 \rho &= \begin{bmatrix} \rho_1 & \rho_2 & \rho_3 \end{bmatrix} \\
 \sigma &= (s, \mathbf{CH}, \mathbf{SKCH}, \mathbf{PA}, n, \rho)
 \end{aligned}$$

# FSV-k-SAN Construction: Sanitize $m_2$ by sanitizer 1




$$\begin{aligned}
 m' &= \begin{bmatrix} m_1 & m'_2 & m_3 \end{bmatrix} \\
 \mathbf{CH} &= \begin{bmatrix} h_1 & h_2 & h_3 \\ r_1 & r_2 & r_3 \\ \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^1 & \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^2 & \text{pk}_{\text{CH}}^3 \end{bmatrix} \\
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 \mathbf{PA} &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\
 s &= \text{Sign}_{\text{SIG}} \left( \begin{array}{l} (\mathbf{CH}_j \cdot h, \mathbf{CH}_j \cdot \text{pk}_{\text{CH}})_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, \mathbf{SKCH}, \\ \mathbf{PA}, \text{pk}_S, \text{PKZ}, n \end{array} \right) \\
 \rho &= \begin{bmatrix} \rho_1 & \rho_2 & \rho_3 \end{bmatrix} \\
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 \mathbf{PA} &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\
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
$$\mathbf{PA} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

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
$$\rho' = \begin{bmatrix} \rho_1 & \rho'_2 & \rho_3 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\sigma' = (s, \mathbf{CH}', \mathbf{SKCH}, \mathbf{PA}, n, \rho')$$

## FSV-k-SAN Construction: Verify



## FSV-k-SAN Construction: Judge



- **Unforgeability** implied by accountability.
- **Immutability** relies on the unforgeability of SIG, the IND-CPA security of PKE, and the collision resistance of CHash.
- **Privacy** relies on the indistinguishability of CHash.
- **Accountability** relies on the unforgeability of SIG and VRS.
- **Full-Sanitization Verifiability** relies on the unforgeability of SIG and VRS.
- **Sanitizer Anonymity** relies on the anonymity of VRS and the IND-CPA security of PKE.



Builds on the work of Bultel *et al.*<sup>1</sup>.

<b>PKE</b> A Public key encryption with homomorphic scalar multiplication	<b>VRS</b> A verifiable ring signature scheme
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
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<sup>1</sup>Bultel, Lafourcade, Lai, Malavolta, Schröder, Thyagarajan. Efficient Invisible and Unlinkable Sanitizable Signatures. PKC 2019.

# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )




# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )




$$m = \begin{bmatrix} m_1 & m_2 & m_3 & \mathbf{PKZ} \end{bmatrix}$$
$$x = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 & x_2 & x_3 & x_4 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$y = \begin{bmatrix} y_1 & y_2 & y_3 & y_4 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$X = \begin{bmatrix} X_1 & X_2 & X_3 & X_4 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$Y = \begin{bmatrix} Y_1 & Y_2 & Y_3 & Y_4 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1 & \sigma_2 & \sigma_3 & \sigma_4 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\mathbf{SKZ} = \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{y_2\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{y_3\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} \\ \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{y_3\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} \end{bmatrix}$$

# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sign ( $n = 3, k = 2$ )



$$\begin{aligned}
 m &= \begin{bmatrix} m_1 & m_2 & m_3 & \mathbf{PKZ} \end{bmatrix} \\
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 y &= \begin{bmatrix} y_1 & y_2 & y_3 & y_4 \end{bmatrix} \\
 X &= \begin{bmatrix} X_1 & X_2 & X_3 & X_4 \end{bmatrix} \\
 Y &= \begin{bmatrix} Y_1 & Y_2 & Y_3 & Y_4 \end{bmatrix} \\
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 \mathbf{SKZ} &= \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{y_2\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{y_3\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} \\ \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{y_3\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} \end{bmatrix} \\
 \mu &= \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(X), \eta = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(Y)
 \end{aligned}$$

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$$\begin{aligned}
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 \sigma &= \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1 & \sigma_2 & \sigma_3 & \sigma_4 \end{bmatrix} \\
 \mathbf{SKZ} &= \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{y_2\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{y_3\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^1} \\ \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{y_3\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{pk_{ZE}^2} \end{bmatrix}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\mu = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(X), \eta = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(Y)$$

$$\sigma_{SS} = (\mu, \eta, (\sigma_j, X_j, Y_j)_{j \in [n]}, \mathbf{SKZ})$$

$$\sigma_{\text{VRS}} = \text{Sign}_{\text{VRS}}(\text{pk}_S \| m \| \sigma_{SS})$$

# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sanitize $m_2$ by sanitizer 1

Randomize  
BLS keys

$$m' = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline m_1 & m'_2 & m_3 & \text{PKZ} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$X' = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline X_1^r & X_2^r & X_3^r & X_4^r \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$Y' = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline Y_1^{r \cdot s} & Y_2^{r \cdot s} & Y_3^{r \cdot s} & Y_4^{r \cdot s} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$\sigma = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline \sigma_1 & \sigma_2 & \sigma_3 & \sigma_2 \\ \hline \end{array}$$


$$\text{SKZ} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{y_2\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} \\ \hline \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$\mu = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(X), \eta = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(Y)$$

$$\sigma_{\text{SS}} = (\mu, \eta, (\sigma_j, X_j, Y_j)_{j \in [n]}), \text{SKZ}$$

$$\sigma_{\text{VRS}} = \text{Sign}_{\text{VRS}}(\text{pk}_S \| m \| \sigma_{\text{SS}})$$

# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sanitize $m_2$ by sanitizer 1



$$m' = \begin{bmatrix} m_1 & m'_2 & m_3 & \text{PKZ} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$X' = \begin{bmatrix} X_1^r & X_2^r & X_3^r & X_4^r \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Y' = \begin{bmatrix} Y_1^{r \cdot s} & Y_2^{r \cdot s} & Y_3^{r \cdot s} & Y_4^{r \cdot s} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\sigma' = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^s & \sigma_2 & \sigma_3^s & \sigma_2^s \end{bmatrix}$$


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$$\mu = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(X), \eta = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(Y)$$

$$\sigma_{\text{SS}} = (\mu, \eta, (\sigma_j, X_j, Y_j)_{j \in [n]}, \text{SKZ})$$

$$\sigma_{\text{VRS}} = \text{Sign}_{\text{VRS}}(\text{pk}_S \| m \| \sigma_{\text{SS}})$$

# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sanitize $m_2$ by sanitizer 1



$$m' = \begin{bmatrix} m_1 & m'_2 & m_3 & \text{PKZ} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$X' = \begin{bmatrix} X_1^r & X_2^r & X_3^r & X_4^r \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Y' = \begin{bmatrix} Y_1^{r \cdot s} & Y_2^{r \cdot s} & Y_3^{r \cdot s} & Y_4^{r \cdot s} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\sigma' = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^s & \sigma_2 & \sigma_3^s & \sigma_2^s \end{bmatrix}$$


$$\mathbf{SKZ} = \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{y_2\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} \\ \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mu = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(X), \eta = \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(Y)$$

$$\sigma_{\text{SS}} = (\mu, \eta, (\sigma_j, X_j, Y_j)_{j \in [n]}, \mathbf{SKZ})$$

$$\sigma_{\text{VRS}} = \text{Sign}_{\text{VRS}}(\text{pk}_S \| m \| \sigma_{\text{SS}})$$

# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sanitize $m_2$ by sanitizer 1



$$m' = \begin{bmatrix} m_1 & m'_2 & m_3 & \text{PKZ} \end{bmatrix}$$

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
$$\mathbf{SKZ} = \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{y_2\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1} \\ \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2} \end{bmatrix}$$

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
$$\mathbf{SKZ}' = \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{y_2\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s \\ \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s \end{bmatrix}$$

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
$$\mathbf{SKZ}' = \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{y_2\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s \\ \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mu' = \text{ChgRepEQS}(\mu, r), \eta' = \text{ChgRepEQS}(\eta, r \cdot s)$$

$$\sigma_{SS} = (\mu, \eta, (\sigma_j, X_j, Y_j)_{j \in [n]}, \mathbf{SKZ})$$

$$\sigma_{VRS} = \text{Sign}_{VRS}(\text{pk}_S \| m \| \sigma_{SS})$$

# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Sanitize $m_2$ by sanitizer 1



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$$\sigma' = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^s & \sigma_2^s & \sigma_3^s & \sigma_2^s \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathbf{SKZ}' = \begin{bmatrix} \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{y_2\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^1}^s \\ \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{y_3\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s & \{0\}_{\text{pk}_{ZE}^2}^s \end{bmatrix}$$


$$\mu' = \text{ChgRep}_{\text{EQS}}(\mu, r), \eta' = \text{ChgRep}_{\text{EQS}}(\eta, r \cdot s)$$

$$\sigma_{SS}' = (\mu', \eta', (\sigma'_j, X'_j, Y'_j)_{j \in [n]}, \mathbf{SKZ}')$$

$$\sigma_{\text{VRS}}' = \text{Sign}_{\text{VRS}}(\text{pk}_S \| m' \| \sigma_{SS}')$$


# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Verify, Prove, and Judge

## Verify




# IUT-k-SAN Construction: Verify, Prove, and Judge


## Verify



## Prove






## Judge



- **Unforgeability** implied by accountability.
- **Immutability** relies on the unforgeability of BLS-like and EQS signatures and the IND-CPA security of PKE.
- **Accountability** relies on the accountability and non-seizability of VRS.
- **Privacy** implied by proof-restricted transparency.
- **Proof-Restricted Transparency** relies on perfect adaptation of EQS, the unlinkability of PKE, the anonymity of VRS, and the unlinkable randomization of BLS-like signatures.
- **Unlinkability** relies on the correctness and IND-CPA security of PKE, the perfect adaptation of EQS, and the unlinkable randomization of BLS-like signatures and public keys.
- **Invisibility** relies on the IND-CPA security of PKE.
- **Sanitizer Anonymity** relies on the anonymity of VRS and the IND-CPA security of PKE.

# Rust Implementation Performance



Thanks for your attention!

# Appendix

**Sign**( $sk_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, m, \mathbf{A}$ )

```

foreach  $j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket$  do
  ( $sk_{CH}, \mathbf{CH}_j.pk_{CH}$ )  $\leftarrow$   $KGen_{CHash}(pp)$ 
  ( $\mathbf{CH}_j.h, \mathbf{CH}_j.r$ )  $\leftarrow$   $Hash_{CHash}(pk_{CH}, (j||m_j))$ 
  foreach  $i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket$  do
     $\mathbf{SKCH}_{i,j} \leftarrow$   $Encrypt_{PKE}(pk_{ZE}^i, sk_{CH} \cdot a_{i,j})$ 
 $\mathbf{PA} := (\mathbf{ADM}^A(j))_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}$ 
 $ms := \left( \begin{array}{c} (\mathbf{CH}_j.h, \mathbf{CH}_j.pk_{CH})_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, \mathbf{SKCH}, \\ \mathbf{PA}, pk_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, n \end{array} \right)$ 
 $s \leftarrow$   $Sign_{SIG}(sk_S, ms)$ 
foreach  $j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket$  do
   $\rho_j \leftarrow$   $Sign_{SIG}(sk_S, (j||m_j||s))$ 
 $\sigma := (s, \mathbf{CH}, \mathbf{SKCH}, \mathbf{PA}, n, \rho)$ 
return  $\sigma$ 

```

**Sanitize**( $sk_Z, pk_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, m, MOD, \sigma$ )

```

 $m' = MOD(m), L := \{pk_{ZP}^i\}_{i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket}, \mathbf{CH}' := \mathbf{CH}$ 
 $\rho' := \rho, i' := i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket \mid pk_Z = (pk_{ZE}^i, pk_{ZP}^i)$ 
foreach  $j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket$  do
  if  $j \in MOD$  then
     $\tau \leftarrow$   $Decrypt_{PKE}(sk_{ZE}, \mathbf{SKCH}_{i',j})$ 
     $\mathbf{CH}'_j.r \leftarrow$   $Adapt_{CHash}(\tau, (j||m_j), (j||m'_j), r_j, h_j)$ 
     $\rho'_j \leftarrow$   $Sign_{VRS}(sk_{ZP}, L, (j||m'_j||s))$ 
 $\sigma' := (s, \mathbf{CH}', \mathbf{SKCH}, \mathbf{PA}, n, \rho')$ 
return  $\sigma'$ 

```

Verify(pk<sub>S</sub>, **PKZ**, m, σ)

$$ms := \left( \begin{array}{l} (h_j, pk_{CH}^j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, \mathbf{SKCH}, \\ \mathbf{PA}, pk_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, n \end{array} \right)$$

$$b_1 \leftarrow \text{Verify}_{\text{SIG}}(pk_S, ms, s)$$

$$b_2 := \bigwedge_{j=1}^n \left\{ \text{Check}_{\text{CHash}}(pk_{CH}^j, (j \| m_j), r_j, h_j) \right\}$$

$$L := \{pk_{ZP}^i\}_{i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket}$$

$$b_3 := \bigwedge_{j=1}^n \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left( \begin{array}{l} \neg \mathbf{PA}_j \wedge \\ \text{Verify}_{\text{SIG}}(pk_S, (j \| m_j \| s), \rho_j) = 1 \end{array} \right) \\ \vee \left( \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{PA}_j \wedge \\ \text{Verify}_{\text{VRS}}(L, (j \| m_j \| s), \rho_j) = 1 \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right\}$$

return  $b_1 \wedge b_2 \wedge b_3$

Judge(pk<sub>S</sub>, **PKZ**, m, σ, π, j)

if  $j = \perp$  then

if  $\exists j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket, \mathbf{PA}_j = 1$  then return Z

else return S

else

if  $\mathbf{PA}_j = 1$  then return Z

else return S

## Sign( $sk_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, m, \mathbf{A}$ )

```

 $m := m \parallel \mathbf{PKZ}, \mathbf{A} \leftarrow \text{AppendC}(\mathbf{A}, (0)^{\llbracket k \rrbracket})$ 
 $x_j, y_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*, X_j := G_1^{x_j}, Y_j := X_j^{y_j}, \forall j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket$ 
 $\mu := \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(sk_{\text{EQS}}, (X_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket})$ 
 $\eta := \text{Sign}_{\text{EQS}}(sk_{\text{EQS}}, (Y_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket})$ 
 $\sigma_j := H(j \parallel m_j)^{y_j}, \forall j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket$ 
foreach  $i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket, j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket$  do
     $\mathbf{SKZ}_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}_{\text{PKE}}(pk_{\text{ZE}}^i, y_j \cdot a_{i,j})$ 
 $\sigma_{\text{SS}} := (\mu, \eta, (\sigma_j, X_j, Y_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, \mathbf{SKZ})$ 
 $t := pk_S \parallel m \parallel \sigma_{\text{SS}}, L := \{pk_{\text{SP}}\} \cup \{pk_{\text{ZP}}^i\}_{i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket}$ 
 $\sigma_{\text{VRS}} \leftarrow \text{Sign}_{\text{VRS}}(sk_{\text{SP}}, L, t)$ 
 $\sigma := (\sigma_{\text{SS}}, \sigma_{\text{VRS}})$ 
return  $\sigma$ 

```

## Sanitize( $sk_Z, pk_S, \mathbf{PKZ}, m, \text{MOD}, \sigma$ )

```

 $m := m \parallel \mathbf{PKZ}, m' = \text{MOD}(m), r, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ 
 $i' := \{i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket \mid pk_Z = (pk_{\text{ZE}}^i, pk_{\text{ZP}}^i)\}$ 
 $(X'_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket} := (X_j^r)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, (Y'_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket} := (Y_j^{r \cdot s})_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}$ 
 $\mu' \leftarrow \text{ChgRep}_{\text{EQS}}(pk_{\text{EQS}}, (X_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, \mu, r)$ 
 $\eta' \leftarrow \text{ChgRep}_{\text{EQS}}(pk_{\text{EQS}}, (Y_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, \eta, r \cdot s)$ 
foreach  $j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket$  do
    if  $j \in \text{MOD}$  do
         $\zeta \leftarrow \text{Decrypt}_{\text{PKE}}(sk_{\text{ZE}}, \mathbf{SKZ}_{i',j}), \sigma'_j := H(j \parallel m'_j)^{\zeta \cdot s}$ 
    else  $\sigma'_j := \sigma_j^s$ 
    foreach  $i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket$  do
         $\mathbf{SKZ}'_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Multiply}_{\text{PKE}}(pk_{\text{ZE}}^i, \mathbf{SKZ}_{i,j}, s)$ 
 $\sigma'_{\text{SS}} := (\mu', \eta', (\sigma'_j, X'_j, Y'_j)_{j \in \llbracket n \rrbracket}, \mathbf{SKZ}')$ 
 $t := pk_S \parallel m' \parallel \sigma'_{\text{SS}}, L := \{pk_{\text{SP}}\} \cup \{pk_{\text{ZP}}^i\}_{i \in \llbracket k \rrbracket}$ 
 $\sigma'_{\text{VRS}} \leftarrow \text{Sign}_{\text{VRS}}(sk_{\text{ZP}}, L, t)$ 
return  $\sigma' := (\sigma'_{\text{SS}}, \sigma'_{\text{VRS}})$ 

```

**Verify**(pk<sub>S</sub>, **PKZ**, *m*, *σ*)

---

$m := m \parallel \mathbf{PKZ}, t := \text{pk}_S \parallel m \parallel \sigma_{SS}$   
 $L := \{\text{pk}_{SP}\} \cup \{\text{pk}_{ZP}^i\}_{i \in [k]}$   
 $b_1 \leftarrow \text{Verify}_{VRS}(L, t, \sigma_{VRS})$   
 $b_2 := (\forall j \in [n], Y_j \neq G_1)$   
 $b_3 \leftarrow \text{Verify}_{EQS}(\text{pk}_{EQS}, (X_j)_{j \in [n]}, \mu)$   
 $b_4 \leftarrow \text{Verify}_{EQS}(\text{pk}_{EQS}, (Y_j)_{j \in [n]}, \eta)$   
 $b_5 := (\forall j \in [n], (e(X_j, \sigma_j) = e(Y_j, H(j \parallel m_j))))$   
 $\text{return } \bigwedge_{j=1}^5 b_j$

**Prove**(sk<sub>S</sub>, **PKZ**, *m*, *σ*, *j*)

---

$m := m \parallel \mathbf{PKZ}, t := \text{pk}_S \parallel m \parallel \sigma_{SS}$   
 $L := \{\text{pk}_{SP}\} \cup \{\text{pk}_{ZP}^i\}_{i \in [k]}$   
 $\pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}_{VRS}(L, t, \sigma_{VRS}, \text{pk}_{SP}, \text{sk}_{SP})$   
**return**  $\pi$

**Judge**(pk<sub>S</sub>, **PKZ**, *m*, *σ*,  $\pi$ , *j*)

---

$m := m \parallel \mathbf{PKZ}, t := \text{pk}_S \parallel m \parallel \sigma_{SS}$   
 $L := \{\text{pk}_{SP}\} \cup \{\text{pk}_{ZP}^i\}_{i \in [k]}$   
 $b \leftarrow \text{Judge}_{VRS}(L, t, \sigma_{VRS}, \text{pk}_{SP}, \pi)$   
**return** *Z* if  $b = 0$  and *S* if  $b = 1$